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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for assault on a
prisoner, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-102.5.

This court has jurisdiction over the matter

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3.
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support
the verdict of the judge?

The standard of review is based upon a

"review of the evidence and all inferences which may be
reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict" or findings of the court in a bench trial, State v.
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1156 (Utah, 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on
appeal is contained in or appended to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 26, 1995, defendant was charged with assault on a
prisoner, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§76-5-102.5 (R. 1-2). The charge stemmed from defendant's
actions towards Ronnie Niel Tischner occurring on or about
October 10, 1995 (R. 1-2).

In a bench trial, the court convicted

the defendant of the charge, (Tr. 164), and subsequently
sentenced the defendant to a term of not more than five years, to
be served at the Utah State Prison (R. 70).
STATEMENT OF THE PACTS
1

A.

Nature of the Case

Defendant, Glen Ray Bullock, was convicted by bench trial in
the Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, on December 19,
1996, of assault on a prisoner, a third-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1995) (Tr. 164). On
February 5, 1996, Glen Ray Bullock was sentenced by Judge Lee
Dever to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five
years (R. 70).
B.

Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition

Defendant was charged in an information dated October 26,
1996, with assault on a prisoner, a third-degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-5-102.5 (1995), (R. 1-2). Prior
to preliminary examination, Glen Ray Bullock filed with the Third
District Court, County of Tooele a motion for discovery (R. 4-7).
A preliminary hearing was held in this matter on November 8,
1995, (R. 13). Prior to this hearing, an entrance of counsel and
request for jury trial was entered (R. 8-9). The request for
jury trial was later waived by the defendant (R. 38). Following
the preliminary hearing the defendant was bound-over to the Third
District Court on the charge (R. 16). At an arraignment held on
November 16, 1995, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding,
Bullock entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge (R. 17).
Prior to trial, Bullock filed with the district court a
motion to suppress all written statements and all verbal
statements (R. 30-33), and a motion to suppress the statement of
Ronnie Niel Tischner (34-36) . On November 30, 1996, an
2

evidentiary hearing was held before the Honorable John A. Rokich
on Bullock's pre-trial motions (R. 37).
At the close of this hearing Judge Rokich denied Bullock's
motions to suppress (R. 3 7).
Defendant's bench trial was originally set for set for
December 5, 1995, (R. 16), but was later postponed and actually
held on December 19, 1995 (R. 46). On December 19, 1996, a bench
trial was held in this matter with Judge Lee Dever presiding (R.
46).

At the bench trial Bullock was represented by David C.

Cundick (Tr. 100) . Bullock was convicted by the court on
December 19, 1995 (R. 46). After trial, Bullock filed a motion
to arrest judgment or for new trial (R. 57-58) . The motion was
denied and Bullock was sentenced to a term of not more than five
years at the Utah State Prison (R. 70).
A Notice of Appeal was filed on February 21, 1996, by David
C. Cundick, and this appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On October 10, 1996, Ronnie Tischner, an inmate at the
Tooele County Jail, was watching television in Unit A when he
felt something on the back of his neck (Tr. 107) . Mr. Tischner
realized that someone had placed shaving cream on the back of his
neck (Tr. 107). He became angry and accused two young men of
putting the shaving cream on him (Tr. 108). At this point the
defendant stepped in and told Mr. Tischner that it was he who had
put the shaving cream on Mr. Tischner's neck (Tr. 141-142). Mr.
Tischner, at trial, identified the defendant as the person who
3

admitted to putting shaving cream on Mr. Tischnerfs neck (Tr.
Ill).

Mr. Tischner made a comment to the defendant asking the

defendant what he was doing (Tr. 108). The two individuals then
became antagonistic towards each other calling each other names
and threatening violence towards each other (Tr. 142). At this
point Mr. Tischner turned and proceeded to return to his cell
(Tr. 108). The defendant proceeded to follow Mr. Tischner to his
cell, cell A-l (Tr. 133, 135). The defendant never quite entered
Mr. Tischner's cell, but instead the defendant reared back and
said "Don't fuck with me" (Tr. 133). As Mr. Tischner entered his
cell he was hit on the back of the neck, fell forward and split
open his eye when he hit the bunk bed (Tr. 109). When Mr.
Tischner arose, there was no one around him (Tr. 109). At this
point a Mr. Ramirez entered Mr. Tischner's cell and told Mr.
Tischner that he needed stitches for the cut to his eye (Tr.
110).

Mr. Tischner proceeded to the infirmary for medical

treatment (Tr. ill). He was intercepted by Deputy Joe Walker who
noticed that Mr. Tischner was bleeding quite profusely (Tr. 118) .
Deputy Walker was on his way to investigate the problem in Unit A
(Tr. 117-118).

When questioned by Deputy Walker Mr. Tischner

responded that he had been hit from behind and pushed into the
bunk bed by the defendant (Tr. 124). Deputy Walker called
another officer to escort Mr. Tischner to the hospital for
treatment (Tr. 119). Deputy Walker was later in the control unit
when he received a call over the intercom from the defendant who
wanted to explain his side of the altercation (Tr. 119, 121).
4

The intercom control panel lights indicated that it was an
intercom call from cell A-3 (Tr. 127), and that the only person
in cell A-3 at the time of the call was the defendant (Tr. 127) .
Deputy Walker then heard the defendant apologize over the
intercom for striking Mr. Tischner but that he did so in selfdefense (Tr. 121). Deputy Walker concluded it was the defendant
not only from the control panel lights but that he recognized the
defendant's voice as the one on the intercom due to his previous
interactions with the defendant (Tr. 127-128).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In order to convict a criminal defendant the State must
prove each and every element of the charge beyond a reasonable
doubt.

Mr. Bullock asserts that the State failed to meet its

burden and therefore his conviction should be reversed.
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal Mr.
Bullock carries a great burden.

He "must marshall all evidence

supporting the ... verdict and must then show how this marshaled
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Lemon, 844
P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted).

Bullock must

show that the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted." State v. Dunn, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 100
(Utah 1993) . The element which Mr. Bullock alleges as unproven
is the element which requires the state to prove beyond a

5

reasonable doubt that the defendant was the individual who
committed the crime.
Bullock has marshaled all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict in his statement of the facts. However,
Mr. Bullock will likewise marshal here the evidence that is
relevant to his sufficiency argument.
ARGUMENT
The first point is that the testimony of Ronnie Tischner
must create reasonable doubt.

Following the confrontation

between Mr. Bullock and Mr. Tischner, Mr. Tischner turned to
return to his cell (Tr. 108). Mr. Tischner stated that he could
not tell if Mr. Bullock was following him, and even further he
was not sure if anyone was following him at all (Tr. 108-109,
112-113) . Mr. Tischner testified that after he was hit he got up
and there was no one around and that he was uncertain whether the
defendant was anywhere near his cell (Tr. 109,113).

Mr. Tischner

never testified that it was the defendant who hit him.

On the

contrary, Mr. Tischner states that he was not sure if the
defendant was following him at all and that when he arose there
was no one around.

In conjunction with this testimony, Mr.

Tischner testified that he "just assumed" it was the defendant
who pushed him, and that he "felt" it was the defendant (Tr.
114).

Reasonable doubt cannot be overcome by assumptions and

feelings.

There is not one scintilla of evidence arising from

Mr. Tischner's testimony which would allow a reasonable mind to
go beyond a reasonable doubt. The only positive identification
6

made by Mr. Tischner is that it was the defendant who put the
shaving cream on his neck (Tr. Ill); no positive identification
as to the defendant being the person who pushed Mr. Tischner was
ever made by Mr. Tischner.
The second point is that the testimony of Deputy Joe Walker
would have to create a reasonable doubt in the minds of a
reasonable person.

Deputy Walker testified on direct and on

cross examination that the intercom call came from cell A-3 as he
recognized the voice (Tr. 127-128).

This testimony was bolstered

by the fact that deputy Walker testified that the intercom light
panel indicated that the call came from cell A-3 (Tr. 127) and
that the only person in cell A-3 was the defendant (Tr. 127).
The defendant was then called to testify at which time the
defendant stated that his assigned cell was A-ll, not A-3 (Tr.
145) . This testimony was corroborated by defense witness Kevin
John Reeder (Tr. 134). The defendant testified that cell A-3
belonged to two other individuals and that it was against the
rules to enter into another persons cell (Tr. 149). Therefore,
it was impossible for him to have been in cell A-3 when Deputy
Walker received the intercom call as the defendant had never been
in cell A-3 (Tr. 157).
Following the defendants testimony Deputy Joe Walker was
called as a State rebuttal witness.

At this time Deputy Walker

changed his testimony so as to conform to the testimony given by
the defendant.

Deputy Walker testified as a rebuttal witness

that the call actually came from cell A-ll and that was the cell
7

to which the defendant was assigned at the time of the incident
(Tr. 151). Deputy Walker testified that the defendant is
currently assigned to cell A-3 and that is why he was mistaken on
his earlier testimony (Tr. 151). Deputy Walker then testified
that the intercom indicator light identified the call as coming
from cell A-ll, not cell A-3 (Tr. 151). However, this testimony
is also flawed as on cross-examination Deputy Walker once again
changed his testimony to agree to the fact that the defendant is
currently assigned to cell A-4, not cell A-3, and Officer Walker
acknowledged as much (Tr. 152).
The many times Deputy Walker was mistaken must have created
a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant. Deputy
Walker first stated that the control panel indicator lights
showed the call as coming from cell A-3, then changed his
testimony to say that the indicator lights showed that the call
came from cell A-ll. Had Deputy Walker stuck to his original
testimony, Mr. Bullock would have been found not guilty as the
admission of guilt could then not possibly have come from Mr.
Bullock as he was never in cell A-3. A finding of guilt was only
possible after Deputy Walker changed his testimony to conform to
the testimony of the defendant.
The third point which must raise a reasonable doubt comes
from the testimony of the only direct witness to the incident.
Kevin John Reeder was called as a defense witness (Tr. 131). Mr.
Reeder testified that the defendant never entered Mr. Tischner's
cell, but remained outside the cell (Tr. 133). Mr. Reeder
8

testified that he did not, at any time, see the defendant strike
Mr. Tischner (Tr. 136-137, 138) and that he only saw the
defendant rear back as if to avoid being struck (Tr. 135) .
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Mr. Bullock requests that this court reverse his conviction
because the evidence introduced at trial is "sufficiently
inconclusive" and that "reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted," as the evidence was insufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did indeed commit
the crime.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of October, 1996.

David C. Cundick
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM

CRIMINAL CODE

197
Section
70.5-408.
76-5-4^9.
76-5-410.
76-5-4H-

Reserved.
Corroboration of admission by child's statement.
Child victim of sexual abuse as competent
witness.
Admissibility of out-of-court statement of child
victim of sexual abuse.

76-5-106.5

(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection dXa) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony.
1995

Part 5
HIV Testing — Sexual Offenders and Victims
76-5-501.
Definitions.
76-5-502.
Mandatory testing — Liability for costs.
76-5-503.
Voluntary testing — Victim to request — Costs
paid by Crime Victim Reparations.
76-5-504.
Victim notification and counseling.
PARTI
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES
76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined.
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who
is in custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or
who is confined in a jail or other penal institution or a facility
used for confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the
Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the confinement is legal.
1994
76-5-102. Assault.
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do
bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence,
that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes
substantial bodily injury to another.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused
caused serious bodily injury to another.
1996
76-5-102.3. Assault against school employees.
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or
private school, with knowledge that the individual is an
employee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of
his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(2) As used in this section, "employee" includes a volunteer.
1992

76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer.
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge
that he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
1987
76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner.
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
1974
76-5-102.6. Assault o n a correctional officer.
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
1994
76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
( D A person commits aggravated assault if he commits
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he:

76-5-103.5. Aggravated assault by prisoner.
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a felony of the
first degree, who commits aggravated assault is guilty of a
felony of the second degree.
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a capital felony or a
felony of the first degree who commits aggravated assault is
guilty of:
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury
was caused; or
(b) a capital felony if serious bodily injury was intentionally caused.
1996
76-5-104.

Consensual altercation no defense to homicide or assault if dangerous w e a p o n used.
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 of
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, or
other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel,
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 was used.
1989
76-5-105. Mayhem.
[(1)] Every person who unlawfully and intentionally deprives a human being of a member of his body, or disables or
renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the tongue, puts
out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem.
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree.
1973
76-5-106. Harassment.
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to
frighten or harass another, he communicates a written or
recorded threat to commit any violent felony.
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor.
1995
76-5-106.5. Definitions — Crime of stalking.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining
a visual or physical proximity to a person or repeatedly
conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by
conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a
person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child,
sibling, or any other person who regularly resides in the
household or who regularly resided in the household
within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a
reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of
his immediate family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a
member of his immediate family;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the
specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury
to himself or a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of
his immediate family will suffer emotional distress;
and

78-2a-3

jUDjCjAL CODE

Pardons and Parole except in cases involvi*'
degree or capital felony;
7*
(n) appeals from district court involving don
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upotf
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
raent, property division, child custody, support <
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeal
adoption, and paternity;
'
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum o^
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
fraction thereof for the period served.
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeal* fcjzi
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment if
Supreme Court.
^ "
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be b/
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. Th^ the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the So
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of * Court for original appellate review and detenninatii
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en ban£' matter over which the Court of Appeals has original ao
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presio1' jurisdiction.
ing judge from among the members of the court by majorit/
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge A ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Pn.
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge 0* Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than tw^
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide fo*" 78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court
Review of the judgments, orders, ana decrees of the Coinfl
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari tojj
of the presiding judge.
f
(4^ The presiding judge may be removed from the office 0* Supreme Court.
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court <r
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals.
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court (T
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt L 3
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functioS
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
any location within the state.
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court <?*
CHAPTERS
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Cou^
QISXOLGX CQUBXS

tern of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and

(5; Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as fiT
the Supreme Court.
19**
78-2a«3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
(1, The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all e*"
traordmary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary'
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and d^*
crees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, inclu^"
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
.
'a) the final orders and decrees resulting from form*
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals fro**1
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed"
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Comxni**
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institution^
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Ftfe
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive dire^*
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of O**'
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer,
(b> appeals from the district court review of:
.
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of politic*
1
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; a* ^
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Secttf*1
63-46a-12.1;
fc"1 appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record &
criminal cases excs^t th^se UVVQIVYO^ a chai^fe <tf a ^ t
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cas^5'
except those involving a conviction of a first degree °T
capital felony;
(f; appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or servi*1^
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constitute
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a fl*'st
degree or capital felony;
(g' appeals from the orders on petitions for extraor^1"
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board °

Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
78-3-3.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Appeals.
78-3-5.
Repealed.
78-3-6.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
78-3-11.5.
State District Court Administrative System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Counties joining court system — Procedure —
Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.2.
District court case management.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and forfeiture!.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to counties.
78-3-18.
Judicial Administration Act — Short title.
78-3-19.
Purpose of act.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
Terms and election — Responsibilities —
Reports [Effective until January 1, 19971.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members —
Terms and election — Responsibilities —
Reports [Effective January 1, 1997].
^Vo-^^b.
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